is not surprising that war tends automatically to imply violence. Indeed in his influential treatise on the anthropology of violence, David Riches identifies warfare as nothing more than "violence that is subject to a certain level of organization." (1986:24 
We tend to emphasize only certain capacities of violence-most notably its capacity to "unmake" and "undo," to disorder, disorganize and destabilize-with little reference to its other possible effects. Most obviously the destructiveness of violence unmakes and takes away life, health, security and property. Similarly the implied violation of the will leads most analysts to interpret wartime migration as /era*/ and involuntary (Kunz 1973 (Kunz , 1981 Richmond 1988; Indra 1999 (1995:8) has termed a form of "massive collective trauma" in which the social tissue of the community is damaged in a manner analogous to that of the tortured physical body (Suarez-Orozco and Robben 2000) . This overwhelming emphasis on violence's capacity to unravel and destroy powerfully shapes how policymakers, journalists, the broader public, and even many social scientists, think about social processes in war-torn re- gions ' . Particularly in recent wars, violence is depicted as both hyper-chaotic and incomprehensible. As Paul Richards notes, the predominant images in depictions of these socalled "new wars" are often "epidemiological," equating the spread of mass violence with the mindlessness and tenacity of a viral contagion (Richards 2004: 2- (Kunz 1973 (Kunz , 1981 
